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DISINTEREST, DISAFFECTION, AND 
PARTICIPATION IN PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 
Warren E. Miller 
Undue emphasis on the decline of voter turnout in national elections and its interpre- 
tation as indicative of political malaise are likely to make for erroneous understanding 
of the American democracy. Evidence from studies of the national electorate con- 
dueted between 1952 and 1978 shows that the explanation for declining turnout is not 
to be found in commensurate diminution in political interest or involvement, or in a 
decreasing sense of civic duty, feeling of political efficacy or trust in government. 
Where patterns of change have coincided, further analysis indicates an absence of 
possible canse-and-effect relationships. The decline has been chiefly limited to those 
population sectors characterized by lack of interest or involvement in national partisan 
polities. The article concludes with a projection of likely developments in political 
participation, including turnout, in future presidential elections. 
The  level  of  voter  tu rnou t  has b e c o m e  a b iennia l  p reoccupa t ion  of  
those c o n c e r n e d  about  the nat ion 's  poli t ical  health.  Since 1960, w h e n  
some 64 pe r cen t  of  those  el igible  to vote  w e n t  to the polls, there  has 
b e e n  a con t inuous  decl ine ,  wi th  each succeed ing  e lec t ion  see ing  a 
smaller  fraction of  the e lectorate  tu rn ing  out  to vote. In  recen t  years,  the 
dec l ine  in the relat ive n u m b e r  of  Amer ican  voters has b e e n  l inked  wi th  
o ther  signs of  nat ional  poli t ical  malaise.  E v e n  at the peak  of  voter  
par t ic ipat ion there  were  occasional  express ions  of  conce rn  among  
those  who  c o m p a r e d  the Amer ican  exper i ence  with the no tab ly  h igher  
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turnout rates usually recorded in other western democracies, but now 
the erosion of partisanship and the apparently diminished role for the 
political parties have been joined with the precipitous decline in trust 
and confidence in government. They have all been taken to signal the 
consequences of alienation and indifference that are presumably 
weakening the foundations of mass political participation necessary for 
a vital democratic process. In sum, the decline in the proportion of 
citizens voting on election day has been taken by many observers as the 
final evidence that our electoral system is in trouble. 
Commentaries that link these various indicators of political malaise 
and, as a consequence, see declining turnout as a forerunner of immi- 
nent change in our political system, are flawed on at least two counts. In 
the first place, the argument that growing disenchantment and disin- 
terest have led to a rejection of the party system and a lack of enthusi- 
asm for participation in electoral politics errs in assuming that the 
several trends are necessarily linked causally, with decreasing partici- 
pation as the final reflection of a national malady. In the second place, 
the argument ignores many other important--perhaps more impor- 
tant-indicators of the sustained health and vitality of the American 
electoral process. 
These errors are of practical interest because in times of crisis and 
rapid change, the need for aeeurate analysis and diagnosis is doubly 
important. It is not only necessary to increase our understanding of the 
nature of our political structures and processes; it is also vitally impor- 
tant to forestall errors of interpretation and judgment which could lead 
to misguided decisions by the nation's political leaders. With the ac- 
cumulation of more and better evidence from social science research, 
there is also accumulating evidence of instances in which judgments 
about the mood of the public have been in error and, at times, have led 
to leaders' decisions that altered the course of political events. For 
example, it now seems clear that such judgments and decisions were a 
result of erroneous interpretations of early primary elections results in 
1968. In that winter and spring 12 years ago, the nature of the response 
to Eugene McCarthy's presidential candidacy was badly misun- 
derstood (Levitin and Miller, 1979). The New Hampshire vote for 
Senator McCarthy, as well as subsequent primary election results in 
settings like rural Wisconsin, were mistakenly attributed to unqualified 
support for his "dove like" opposition to the Viet Nam war. Subsequent 
analysis revealed that McCarthy received the plurality of his support 
from New Hampshire hawks, not doves, just as he received strong 
support from the conservative neo-isolationist farming communities in 
western Wisconsin. It is at least possible that if Lyndon Johnson had 
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read New Hampshire as a demand for a tougher stand in Viet Nam he 
might not have resigned his bid for reelection so soon, and that Robert 
Kennedy might not have made his ill-fated decision to contest for the 
presidency that year because of an over-estimate of support for Ameri- 
can withdrawal from combat. 
With less drama, and much less political consequence, the national 
address by President Carter in July 1979 reflected a similar misun- 
derstanding of the nature of changing American sentiment with regard 
to trust in government. In that instance, a very recent massive erosion of 
confidence in government felt by the minority Republicans slightly 
outweighed a clear upturn in confidence on the part of President 
Carter's fellow partisans in the Democratic majority (Miller, 1979). 
Unaware that his first two years in office had encouraged his supporters 
while striking despair in the hearts of his opponents, Mr. Carter inter- 
preted the net result as an undifferentiated indication of the continuing 
general decline of trust in government, which had indeed marked the 
entire period from the mid-1960s through the election of 1976. His 
exhortation to Americans to have faith in each other and in his adminis- 
tration was at least curiously timed and may have done more to exacer- 
bate the problem than to resolve it. In this instance as in the former, 
more thoroughgoing analysis of available evidence could have fore- 
stalled a misreading of public sentiment and an unwarranted adjust- 
ment of leaders' perspectives. 
In the process of analyzing changes that are taking place in the world 
of politics, whether they are changes in approval given to national 
leaders or other changes in citizens' attitudes and beliefs, it is important 
to determine whether the observed changes really have the meaning 
and significance attributed to them. It is of equal importance to identify 
and distinguish changes that may be relatively episodic or ephemeral 
from those that may be of more enduring character. Where turnout is 
concerned, it may indeed be appropriate (given a modicum of concern 
for democratic values and the continued health of a democratic polity) 
to worry about the persistently low levels of voter turnout which distin- 
guish elections in the twentieth century from those of earlier years; but, 
as we shall note shortly, more recent changes in the proportion voting, 
such as reflected in the decline in turnout from 1960 to 1976, most likely 
constitute a quite different, and possibly quite limited, source of con- 
c e r n .  
The unrelieved preoccupation with turnout figures as measures of 
the health of our national electoral process is too simplistic. It often 
reflects a rather primitive understanding of the complexity of politics in 
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rest on placing unqualified emphasis on a kind of quantitative 
egalitarianism wherein each vote is considered equal to each other 
vote, but wherein it is not only as sumed that more participation is better 
but that the sheer amount of voting is a sufficient test of the health of the 
system. 
Informed political commentary should take a number of different 
perspectives into account in the assessment of nonvoting. From at least 
two perspectives, the relatively simplistic view of American politics 
does seem entirely appropriate for those interested in the well-being of 
democracy. First, if nonvoting in fact reflects alienation, and if in- 
creases in nonvoting are the result of active rejection of the political 
system, then an increase in an already high rate of nonvoting may 
indeed indicate or foretell systemic crisis. Even if nonvoting reflects 
only indifference, the problem may still be worrisome, but it may" be 
more a long-range than an immediate problem. It is quite possible that 
indifference is a reflection of satisfaction, and the more satisfied the 
more indifferent and, therefore, the more nonvoting. Even if this is 
true, however, persistent nonvoting because of indifference may create 
a pool of nonparticipants who are inexperienced in the activities es- 
sential to democratic government. A reservoir of perennial nonpar- 
ticipants may be a benign indicator in good times, but as the experience 
with the rise of totalitarian mass movements suggests, in the long run it 
may constitute a major problem for democratic government in times of 
dire or sudden crisis (Campbell et al., 1960:402-40). 
From other perspectives, a concentrated focus on the score card of 
sheer numbers alone is seriously misplaced. For example, Richard 
Boyd (1980) has recently suggested that turnout in national elections 
should be appraised in the broader context of all American elections. 
The continued growth of governmental units, particularly at the local 
level, has brought a substantial increase in the numbers of oppor- 
tunities Americans have to go to the polls. Therefore, the assessment of 
a decline in turnout for any given class of elections must clearly take 
account of the fuller context provided by the total universe of elections. 
Boyd's argument, rather persuasively documented, is that participation 
in all forms of elections has in fact steadily increased. However, given a 
relatively constant level of citizens interest in politics, a trade-off may 
be involved insofar as voting in national elections is concerned. As a 
consequence of the proliferation of local contests, national elections 
absorb less of the voters' energies and therefore witness a decline in 
turnout. With the "de-coupling" of state and local elections from the 
presidential elections--with more of the former held in nonpresiden- 
tial years--voting in presidential elections may have decreased con- 
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comitantly with increased voting in local governmental elections and 
on all manner of referred questions of public policy, particularly ques- 
tions concerning taxation and governmental finance. 
From yet another quite different perspective, the single-minded 
interest in turnout in national elections as the prime indicator of the 
health of the polity has long see.med anomalous. Political analysts 
never do as well in accounting for the difference between voters and 
nonvoters as they do in accounting for the difference between Demo- 
cratic and Republican voters. In our usual attempts to account for a 
given level of turnout in a presidential election, the basic problem 
seems to be that many people vote without having any very good or 
obvious reason for doing so. The proportion of voters consistently runs 
much higher than the proportion of people who care how the election 
comes out, or who are informed about partisan alternatives, or who 
articulate any particular reason for going to the polls. Among the inter- 
ested and informed segments of the population, voting turnout is al- 
ways understandably very high. But among the largely disinterested 
and uninvolved, there is always a substantial cadre who nevertheless 
do turn out and participate even though, by any model of rational 
behavior, the evidence suggests their choice should be to abstain. 
Turnout, in other words, has always been such an ambiguous indicator 
of interest or involvement on the part of the citizen that the real chal- 
lenge has been to explain why turnout is so high, not why it is so low. 
There is yet another perspective which makes a single-minded inter- 
est in turnout even less persuasive. That perspective attends to all of 
the other forms of political participation engaged in prior to any elec- 
tion. Whether in response to invitations from political leaders who seek 
out constituents' opinions, or whether  as a consequence of self- 
generated desire to voice one's opinions or demands, large numbers of 
citizens do in fact engage in a wide variety of political activities that are 
often more certain and less equivocal means of linking leaders with the 
led than is the simple act of casting a single vote. Even without a very 
highly differentiated or sophisticated view of the political process, it 
seems reasonable to pay attention to the full variety of actions that, in 
addition to the vote, connect political leaders to the electorate. For 
example, one may deplore the fact that voting turnout dropped 7 per- 
centage points between 1964 and 1976, but one might also take heart 
from knowing that the proportion of the public engaged in writing 
letters to public officials increased by 65 percent (up 11 percentage 
points from 17 percent to 28 percent) in the same period. It is true that 9 
percent fewer of the eligibles turned out in 1976 than voted in the first 
Stevenson-Eisenhower election in 1952; it is also true that the number 
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of citizens who voluntarily at tempted to persuade others to vote for the 
candidate or party of their choice increased by exactly the same amount 
during the same period. It would also seem important to recognize that 
the proportion of the electorate voluntarily making financial contribu- 
tions to one's preferred party or candidate increased by 12 percentage 
points between 1952 and 1976, while turnout was dropping 9 points 
(and while the 16 percent who contributed in 1976 marked an "all time 
high" over the past quarter century, it is probably an underestimate of 
contributors; the figure undoubtedly misses many citizens who used 
the voluntary "checkoff '  option on their income tax returns). 
More generally, while turnout in national elections has dropped 
consistently from 1960 on, the proportion of the electorate which has 
turned out to vote on election day and which has also engaged in some 
other form of electorally relevant participation has remained virtually 
unchanged across the 16 year span from 1960 to 1976. From this 
perspective it seems not unreasonable to conclude that while the sheer 
proportions of those voting may have declined, the overall quality of 
national political participation improved between 1952 and 1960 and 
has remained constant during the ensuing years of declining turnout. 
EXPLAINING TURNOUT 
Given the importance of the many different modes of electorally 
relevant participation, it seems desirable to shift our analytic attention 
away from the singular act of turnout to emphasize the more com- 
prehensive set of acts that provide the full network of linkages tying 
political leaders to the electorate at large. Before doing so, however, it 
is worth returning momentarily to the questions of the role of disinter- 
est and disaffection in the decline of election day turnout at the polls. 
First, there is substantial evidence that general public interest in poli- 
tics and public affairs has not declined since 1960. In fact, self-declared 
interest in following politics and public affairs has increased rather 
markedly during this period. Second, throughout the same period the 
electorate's general sense of the civic obligation to vote has remained 
constant and has not declined. Third, personal sense of the efficacy of 
one's political activity has not matched the drop in election day voting. 
And fourth, the use of the mass media to follow politics and political 
campaigns also has not diminished at all during the period of declining 
turnout. 
The apparent anomaly created by the persistence of widespread 
political involvement in the face of decreasing participation at the polls 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































categories of political interest, civic duty, political efficacy, or media 
use. It becomes clear that the steady decline in turnout between 1960 
and 1976 is matched primarily by the steady decline in turnout on the 
part of those who pay attention to public affairs "only now and then" or 
"never." On the part of those who report they are attentive "most of the 
time," there was a small drop in turnout between 1960 and 1964, but 
thereafter the turnout rate has remained virtually unchanged. The same 
is true where citizen duty is concerned. It is among those with the least 
sense of civic obligation to vote that there has been the sharpest decline 
in voting rates; turnout has remained at a high level among the persis- 
tently large group with the greatest sense of civic obligation. All of this 
suggests that the decline in election day voting has been concentrated 
very disproportionately in those sectors of the electorate in which one 
has always found the least political interest and a lack of sense of civic 
virtue, leaving the burden of voting more and more heavily with those 
who are committed to the democratic process and whose participation 
maximizes its quality. 
A sharper and perhaps more insightful view of the actual process of 
short-term demobilization is suggested by an analysis of the relation- 
ship between voter turnout and strength of partisan identification. The 
explication of this specific analysis rests, in turn, on a somewhat more 
complex analysis that addresses, in the first instance, the nature of 
declining partisanship within the electorate. The details of that analy- 
sis are presented elsewhere, and for the present purposes it is enough 
to review the major conclusions (Miller and Miller, 1977). One of the 
more fallacious conceptions about contemporary American politics 
holds that there has been a wholesale rejection of partisanship on the 
part of former party loyalists and one-time party identifiers. It is unde- 
niable that the national distributions of party identification have shifted 
markedly over the past few decades. Today there are fewer citizens 
with a sense of strong partisanship than in the early 1960s. There has 
also been a substantial increase in the proportion of citizens who think 
of themselves predominantly as independents, although the change in 
proportions of those who persistently deny any sense of partisan pref- 
erence has been much less dramatic than many commentaries would 
lead one to expect. 
A reduction in the proportions of strong partisans and an increase in 
the proportion of nonpartisans would necessarily imply that partisans 
have chosen to become nonpartisans only if there were no change in the 
composition of the electorate. In point of fact there has, of course, been 
a substantial change in the composition of the electorate across the 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































noted. A disaggregation of each year's electorate into four-year cohorts 
(composed of those who have in common the date of their first eligi- 
bility to vote in a presidential election) immediately discloses that most 
of the change in partisanship has been the result of the young replacing 
the old. Beginning in 1968, but most noticeably in 1972 and 1976, the 
new cohorts entering the electorate were much less partisan, and more 
often totally devoid of partisan preference, than their counterparts of 
earlier years. At the same time, the old cohorts (whose numbers of 
active voters were declining through very real mortality) contained the 
largest of proportions of strong partisans. The replacement of the old 
with the young accounts for the overwhelming porportion of the de- 
cline in partisanship noted in the succession of national distributions of 
part}, identification across the years. The rejection of partisanship by 
one-time partisans accounts for no more than one-fifth of the net de- 
cline in partisanship portrayed in Table 7. This fact is important on two 
counts. First, it leads to the rejection of the hypothesis that the decline 
in partisanship has been largely a function of a rejection of partisanship 
as party loyalists have changed to political independents. This, in turn, 
suggests a rejection of the hypothesis that declining trust in govern- 
ment, which has occurred uniformly across all age cohorts, has been 
either a cause of or caused by the rejection of partisanship. 
The change in partisan topography--and the magnitude should not 
be overestimated--is most reasonably and parsimoniously interpreted 
as the consequence of an antipolitics, antiparty era which had a major 
impact on the politicization of young citizens without causing a major 
disruption in the partisanship of the established voters. The impact of 
the period of the New Politics of a decade ago was very real, and this 
impact has left a "generational" scar on tile polity. 
An inspection of turnout rates within categories of partisanship 
across the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s reveals patterns that are consistent 
with this compositional interpretation of generational changes in the 
nation's part isanship.  I f  a comparison is drawn be tween  the 
Eisenhower era and the Carter election, turnout is in fact steady or 
higher for all categories of partisans except for the Independent- 
Independents, where turnout declined by some 20 percentage points 
between 1956 and 1976. Taking 1960, the year of peak turnout, as the 
base, a comparison with 1976 turnout indicates no decline in turnout 
among strong partisans, a moderate decline among weak partisans, and 
a sharp decline among Independent-Independents. These patterns are 
thoroughly consonant with the general conclusion that the decline in 
turnout has occurred primarily among the disinterested and unin- 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the electorate of younger citizens who lack a sense of engagement in 
the partisan politics of the nation (see Beck, 1974). It is only among the 
poorly educated, those with low incomes or with other attributes of low 
socioeconomic status, or among those least informed about or least 
engaged by the national partisan competition, that one observes 
alarming declines in voting turnout. 
A final piece of evidence that separates the alleged nationwide in- 
crease in alienation and disaffection from the coincident decrease in 
turnout is provided by a replication of an analysis first completed 
following the 1976 elections (Miller and Miller, 1977). Table 10 below 
replicates that analysis across the past four elections. The general 
conclusion seems unmistakable. Once one takes account of the inter- 
relationships among trust in government, sense of political efficacy, 
and turnout, it is evident that lower turnout is not at all associated with 
lower degrees of trust or increased cynicism. Indeed, on the average, 
across the eight comparisons that can be made of turnout rates for 
citizens distinguished by having high or low trust, turnout is a fraction 
of a percent higher for those exhibiting lesser degrees of trust. (Sense of 
political efficacy is equally uniformly a strong correlate of the propen- 
sity to vote.) 
The explanation for declining turnout is not to be found in commen- 
surate declines in political interest or involvement, or in a decreasing 
sense of civic duty, feelings of political efficacy, or trust in government. 
Few of these indicators of citizen commitment to political action have 
themselves changed to match the decline in turnout, and where the 
patterns of change have coincided, further analysis indicates the total 
absence of possible cause-and-effect relationships. To understand the 
drop in turnout, we must come to understand why the major decline has 
been limited to those sectors regularly characterized by lack of interest 
or involvement in national partisan politics. In sum, declining turnout 
cannot be attributed to an aggregation of decreased individual com- 
mitments to democracy because none of the general indicators of inter- 
est in politics show a parallel decline. Moreover, the decline in turnout 
has not taken place as a consequence of declining trust or increased 
alienation; there is simply no direct causal link between attitudes of 
trust in government and the decision to vote. 
It is worth noting that the drop in turnout is not a consequence of 
changes occurring with regard to sex roles or the de facto enfranchise- 
ment of those black citizens who were effectively barred from the polls 
in the 1950s and early 1960s. Between the Eisenhower elections and 
the elections of the 1970s; the female turnout rate is virtually constant, 
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Across the same period it is white turnout that drops, more than offset- 
ting a 30 point increase in black voting. 
ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN THE YEARS TO COME 
A summary view of what we may expect in the way of political 
participation (including turnout) in future presidential elections can be 
evoked by reviewing three somewhat different sets of relevant factors. 
The first set of factors concerns social structure and social norms. Some 
aspects of changing age distributions, sex roles, educational levels, and 
racial equity are thoroughly predictable, and yet the intrusion of recent 
political events on the political significance of each of these factors 
makes prediction of the political consequences of their change less 
than certain; e.g., black mobilization may persist, and yet the outburst 
of black frustration and disillusionment in Miami in May 1980 indicates 
that black citizens cannot be taken for granted as regular participants in 
normally institutionalized electoral parties. 
A second set of factors concerns analogous political structures and 
norms pertaining to party and participation. Here the problem of pre- 
diction is somewhat different. Legal barriers to participation are still in 
flux. Institutional support for partisanship is still undergoing change as 
a consequence of electoral reforms first introduced a decade ago. The 
proliferation of elections and possible increased use of the referendum 
may further complicate attempts to project rates of partisanship in 
national elections. It is difficult to predict future changes in partisan- 
ship and participation, because the institutions that sustain or enhance 
them are themselves subject to unpredictable changes in the near 
future. 
Third, and finally, projections into the future must accommodate, if 
they cannot anticipate, the uniqueness of short-term factors that are 
more or less characteristic of every national election. Of course, candi- 
dates change, as do the salience and content of the issues around which 
their campaigns are organized. And even the most pervasive of long- 
term secular trends can be interrupted by unforeseen short-term social 
or economic events, as well as by the vagaries of our unique process of 
presidential candidate selection. 
Turning to social characteristics first, one could look at the present 
age distribution of the population and conclude that turnout will in- 
evitably increase in the near future. The wave of young entrants into 
the electorate has crested and is now rapidly receding. Over the next 
decade there will be fewer and fewer numbers in succeeding cohorts 
entering the electorate. As a consequence, the average age of the 
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electorate will certainly increase, and, unless past regularities are dis- 
turbed, the increase in age will be associated with an increase in 
turnout. This could be all the more dramatic because of the relative size 
of the cohorts that entered in 1968, 1972, and 1976--particularly in 1972 
with the lowering of the voting age. Barring future catastrophies of a 
magnitude resembling those that began with the Vietnam war and 
ended with Watergate, one might optimistically expect the rate of 
politization of these "New Politics" generatiousmnow a growing pro- 
portion of the electorate--to be even more rapid while they are in their 
late twenties and early thirties than has been historically true of young 
adults. If this were to occur, the increase in rate of participation would 
be even steeper than the age/turnout curves generated from the 1950s 
and the 1960s would suggest, the generational differences in turnout 
that are now so apparent would be muted, and a rapid increase in 
national turnout rates would result. At the same time, the prediction of 
an upturn in voting as the young grow older may be thwarted if the scar 
of the New Politics era remains strong, and if large proportions of those 
now under 35 remain unpoliticized and outside the ambit of national 
partisan politics. 
Changes in sex roles promise less dramatic change in the future, but 
there is reason to expect that the gap between male and female partici- 
pation will continue to diminish. In the early 1950s male participation 
ran some 11-12 percent above female. This was reduced to no more 
than 4-6 percent at the turn of the decade entering into the 1970s. As 
occupational opportunities for women increase, and as equality of the 
sexes spreads to the periphery of society, the remaining sex differ- 
entials now found largely in rural and working class sectors may well 
disappear and produce an overall gain in citizen turnout in the process. 
Barring a sudden reduction in the desirability of education, the 
dramatic shift in educational level of the electorate that has occurred 
since World War II will continue as the young replace the old. Given 
the range of consequences associated with education, including the 
acquisition of skills necessary for issue-oriented voting and the acqui- 
sition of attributes necessary for social mobility, it is reasonable to 
expect larger and larger proportions of the electorate to have the per- 
sonal resources and the social support necessary for high rates of social 
participation, including voting. However, the same personal resources 
may, as Shively (1979) has noted, reduce voter reliance on parties and 
further erode the parties' ability to influence voter turnout. 
Racial differences in turnout have been virtually eliminated, al- 
though the relatively recent mobilization of many blacks is still re- 
flected in a rather unusual volatility for black voting. A reasonable 
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expectation would be that black turnout levels would stabilize on a par 
with those of white citizens. 
All of these factors, supplemented by their correlates in the domains 
of occupation and income, may be expected to enhance citizens' sense 
of civic obligation, sense of political efficacy, and interest in the 
broader social world, including the world of politics. These attitudinal 
correlates of political participation have been strengthened rather dra- 
matically over the past quarter century, and there is every reason to 
expect the direction of change, if not the rate of change, to persist into 
the future and, thereby, produce an increase in voting turnout. 
Anticipation and projection are less certain as one comes closer to the 
political core of the electoral process. It seems plausible to expect that 
the remaining legal barriers to participation will continue to drop as 
better social bookkeeping permits such things as permanent personal 
registration without fraud. The growing movement toward national 
uniformity of the administration of elections will almost certainly facil- 
itate rather than inhibit political participation. 
On the other hand, the future of partisanship in American politics is 
much less clear. Much has been written on the deleterious impact of 
various electoral process reforms on the political party. Public finance 
of election campaigns, particularly at the state and local level, could be 
the latest in a series of changes that result in a catastrophic erosion of 
the foundations of partisan politics. If public funds are channeled 
directly to candidates for office, bypassing the party organization as is 
already the case in some states, the parties' abilities to influence candi- 
date selection, campaign platforms and the mobilization of the vote 
may be severely curtailed. (Jones, 1980a and 1980b) The new technol- 
ogy of campaigning may, in conjunction with increased public funding 
and increased direct voter participation through primary elections, 
further undercut the public role of the political party. The evidence 
thus far suggests, moreover, that if such changes diminish citizens" 
sense of party involvement they are likely to be reflected in a diminu- 
tion of willingness to turn out on election day. 
In addition to the institutional regularities that may influence both 
inclination and ability to participate in party politics in the future, short- 
term fluctuations of political circumstance may be expected to con- 
found any specific prediction about future election participation. Ex- 
pectations about the competitiveness or closeness of a race interact 
with perceptions that differentiate contending parties or candidates to 
influence voter turnout. The expectation of a highly competitive race 
between sharply different candidates is likely to increase both partici- 
pation and turnout, where perceptions of impending landslide vic- 
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tories or perceptions of insignificant differences between contenders is 
likely to work against engaging the interest of  potential voters in par- 
ticipating in election campaigns and elections themselves (Ferejohn 
and Fiorina, 1979). While it does appear to be true that turnout is not a 
direct function of the relative combined attractiveness or unattractive- 
ness of the candidates, most of the other attributes that distinguish one 
election from another do seem likely to influence participation in 
electoral activities (Weisberg, 1969). 
In general, it seems appropriate to expect a continuation or even a 
modest  increase in the present  relatively high levels of informal par- 
ticipation. A resurgence of partisanship and occasions of close partisan 
competition would most probably promote a substantial increase in 
turnout. However,  at the same time that changes in social structure and 
social norms facilitate a wide range of political action, it is also possible 
that turnout itself may continue its relative decline. Although the topic 
is appropriate to a more extended and more direct analysis than' has 
been suggested here, it seems likely that American politics is under- 
going a qualitative change that may differentiate, with increasing 
sharpness, those citizens who are advantaged by personal resources 
and social location from those who are disadvantaged in both personal 
and social domains. 
It seems likely that the politics of tomorrow will be more heavily 
oriented by ideology and more sharply focused on issue voting. Issue 
voting, in turn, is enhanced by most of the long-term social trends just 
discussed, including increased levels of formal education and in- 
creased sensitivity to group demands such as are represented by the 
calls for racial and sexual equality. To the extent that this is true, the 
complexities of political decision-making will doubtless discourage 
many citizens who would have voted in a different era. For all that one 
may decry thoughtless reliance on the symbols of party, and affective 
response to the call to join in partisan conflict, the earlier dominance of 
party in national politics doubtless encouraged many otherwise rela- 
tively uninterested and uninformed citizens at least to turn out on 
election day. If  the organizing symbols of party are submerged under  
the diverse appeals of relatively independent  candidates, and if candi- 
dates argue about the existence and consequence of a Phillips curve 
based on the relationship be tween rates of inflation and proportions of 
u n e m p l o y m e n t ,  or the  intr icate  problems  of  increas ing ene rgy  
supplies, or the complex problems involving the interaction be tween 
international trade and domestic industrial production, it seems rea- 
sonable to presume that the turnout rate among the disadvantaged will 
decline still further. Participation in the sectors that already participate 
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at near maximum strength may be preserved, but at the expense of the 
quantitative egalitarianism which expects at least a high turnout rate on 
election day. Whether  or not such a political future would serve the 
long-term needs of a system dedicated to representative democracy 
remains to be seen. 
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